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Child-Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and
Race
By Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, Leonardo
Felli and Leeat Yariv ∗
This paper uses a new data set on child-adoption matching to
estimate the preferences of potential adoptive parents over U.S.-
born and unborn children relinquished for adoption. We identify
significant preferences favoring girls and against African-American
children put up for adoption. These attitudes vary in magnitudes
across different adoptive parents – heterosexual, same-sex couples,
and single women. We consider the effects of excluding single
women and same-sex couples from the process, and find that this
would substantially reduce the overall number of adopted children.
Adoption is an important phenomenon in the U.S. According to the Census
2000, about 1.6 million or 2.5% of all children were adopted. Of these, 87%
were U.S.-born and adopted through the domestic-adoption channel. In terms of
revenues, the adoption industry is a substantial one, generating approximately
2-3 billion dollars annually (see Riben, 2007).
In most cases, a successful domestic adoption is the result of a match between a
birth mother (BMO hereafter) who seeks to relinquish her child, and prospective
adoptive parents (PAPs hereafter). The underlying matching process is fairly
decentralized and involves a bilateral search characterized by several layers of
mediation: Typically, adoption agencies represent BMOs, while PAPs work vis-
a`-vis adoption agencies, lawyers, or facilitators.
According to the Census, 54% of U.S.-born adopted children under the age
of 10 are female, and 18% are African-American. In contrast, girls and African-
Americans represent 48% and 15% of all children, respectively.1 These differences
can be explained by either the preferences of PAPs (the demand side), or the
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characteristics of children relinquished for adoption by BMOs (the supply side).
In this paper, we exploit the unique nature of a new data set documenting the
operations of an adoption facilitator in order to disentangle demand and supply
effects on outcomes. We identify the preferences of PAPs over the attributes
of children relinquished for adoption, the BMOs’ choices, and the factors that
determine ultimate outcomes (i.e., a successful adoption, a decision to parent by
the BMO, or a child’s placement in foster care).
Our data set was constructed by following the matching process of an online
adoption facilitator between 2004 and 2009. The data set is comprised of approx-
imately 840 cases of either born or unborn children that the facilitator collected
from multiple agencies and posted on a website designed for client PAPs. On
the website, each child is identified by a code, by an array of attributes, by the
adoption finalization costs, and by a set of restrictions imposed by the BMO
specifying which categories of PAPs she considers acceptable (such as straight
couples, same-sex couples, etc).
Each PAP pays a fixed fee to the facilitator to enter this matching process.
PAPs who participate in the matching process observe the children available for
adoption sequentially and can express interest in any child by submitting an
application to the BMO (as long as they meet the BMO’s requirements). Our
data records all the PAPs that apply for each child, as well as some BMOs’ final
choice, be it selecting an applicant PAP, matching through channels other than
the facilitator, or deciding to parent the child.
Table 1—Aggregate Statistics on Applications for Matched Children
Variable All No Five or More Matched Matched
Applications Applications on Website
Already Born 9.4% 24.2% 5.6% 8.3% 5.4%
Girl 25.9% 21.7% 35.7% 26.7% 29.2%
Boy 34.4% 33.7% 25.9% 35.7% 44.6%
Caucasian 35.8% 26.6% 50.4% 36.8% 38.5%
African-American 40.9% 51.2% 22.9% 38.6% 35.9%
Hispanic 14.5% 13.8% 18.4% 15.5% 16.0%
BMOs 662 91 143 409 65
As motivation for our analysis, consider Table 1, documenting attributes of chil-
dren in our data for whom we know the ultimate adoption outcomes (whether they
were matched, through the facilitator or otherwise). Focusing on gender, 25.9%
of the children are girls, while 34.4% are boys (the rest being of unknown gender).
The matching outcomes seem to reflect a similar pattern – be it on the website, or
overall, more boys are ultimately matched than girls (in fact, the wedge is greatest
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for the facilitator’s matches). However, when looking at the volume of applica-
tions children receive, this pattern is reversed. The percentage of boys receiving
no applications is substantially higher than that corresponding to girls, and large
volumes of applications (five or more) are much more likely to occur for girls than
for boys (35.7% relative to 25.9%). A similar effect emerges with respect to race.
For example, Caucasian children constitute 35.8% of the sample, while African-
American children constitute 40.9%. The differences in matching outcomes are
also rather small, both overall and through the facilitator (though slightly more
Caucasian children are matched on the facilitator’s website). However, a rather
different image emerges from the applications profile. Of the children receiv-
ing no applications, 26.6% are Caucasian, while 51.2% are African-American; Of
the children receiving five or more applications, 50.4% are Caucasian, while only
22.9% are African-American. This suggests that the matching outcomes in and
of themselves provide a partial picture of the attributes parents are looking for,
while their application choices entail much more information.
In order to elicit parents’ preferences directly from their behavior in the applica-
tion process, we need to account for the supply of children of different attributes.
A revealed preference assumption is at the root of our estimation: whenever PAPs
apply for a subset of the children available, the PAPs prefer the children they apply
for over those they do not. This approach enables us to estimate the preferences
on each side of the matching process separately. Its main advantage is that it
is not sensitive to either demand or supply shifts. We estimate PAPs’ marginal
rates of substitution over children’s attributes (gender, race, and time to birth)
and adoption finalization costs.
We show that PAPs exhibit a preference in favor of girls and against African-
American children. Specifically, if we consider a non-African-American child, the
probability that a given PAP expresses interest in such a child is 11.6% if the child
is a girl and 8.2% if the child is a boy. The effect of the estimated adoption cost on
child desirability is significant and negative. That is, ceteris paribus, an increase
in expected adoption costs lowers the desirability of a child. This allows us to
convert the gender preference into dollars: the increase in desirability of a non-
African-American girl with respect to a non-African-American boy is equivalent
to about $18, 300 decrease in adoption finalization costs.
With regard to race, most children in our data are characterized by the compo-
sition of varying percentages of three ethnicities: Caucasian, African-American,
and Hispanic. For an unborn child of unknown gender, the probability that a
given PAP expresses interest in the child is about 13.1% if the child is non-
African-American and 1.8% if the child is African-American. Again, converting
the racial preference into dollars, we find that the increase in desirability of a
non-African-American child with respect to an African-American child (both of
unknown gender) is equivalent to about $37, 600 decrease in adoption finalization
costs. However, we do not observe any significant bias against Hispanic children,
who represent a substantial fraction of the children in our data set. This is impor-
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tant when contemplating what underlies the observed gender preferences. Indeed,
the PAPs in our sample are predominantly Caucasian and so one might conjec-
ture that a desire for children that resemble PAPs in looks, who can potentially
pass as their biological children, is at the root of some of the racial preferences we
identify. However, to the extent that Hispanic children are more likely to appear
different from Caucasian PAPs relative to Caucasian children, such a force would
suggest a (possibly weaker) bias against Hispanic children as well, which is not
confirmed by the data.
A natural concern pertains to the selection of participants on both sides into
the matching process. In particular, observed characteristics of children (such as
gender and race) may signal important health and behavioral attributes. Conse-
quently, estimated PAPs’ preferences may simply reflect their concerns regarding
health and behavior. To address this, we look at the correlation between gender
and race of the children in our data and an array of health and behavioral mea-
sures of the BMOs. We find no significant difference in any of these measures
across gender and race. If anything, we find that African-American BMOs are
associated with slightly more desirable health and behavioral markers. On the
other side of the process, the preferences of the PAPs that select into the facili-
tator’s operations may not be representative of the entire population of adoptive
parents. However, using the Census 2000 data, we find that the cases available
through the facilitator end up with adoptions of substantially more boys and
African-American children relative to the average adopting household in the U.S.
This suggests that PAPs selecting into the facilitator’s client pool are potentially
more open to adopting boys and African-American children.
We also estimate the extent to which PAPs’ preferences depend on their own
characteristics. The preferences mentioned above hold true for all categories of
PAPs (heterosexual and same-sex couples, as well as single applicants), and the
racial preference is stronger for same-sex couples. However, same-sex couples
submit applications at nearly three times the rate of straight ones.
On the normative side, the question of which parents are legitimate prospective
adoptive parents (specifically, for the case of same-sex or single PAPs) is a topic of
ongoing debate in the U.S. and abroad. Banning a certain category of PAPs from
the adoption process has two effects. First, it affects the volume of PAPs involved
in the process, and therefore the number of expected matches. Second, given
the differential preferences across PAPs’ categories, it changes the distribution of
preferences among active PAPs and consequently impacts the type of children that
are adopted. Focusing on the effects of participation of same-sex couples, we shut
down the possibility for same-sex PAPs to submit applications to BMOs, and we
find that this results in a 9% decrease in the probability of being matched (while
only 20% of matched children allow for same-sex applications). Furthermore,
there are significantly more boys and African-American children within the lost
matches. Similarly, when we shut down the possibility of single PAPs to submit
applications, we find a reduction of 9% as well in overall matches (out of 57% of
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matched children that allowed for single PAP applications).
A. Literature Review
Despite the scope of the adoption industry in terms of volume of children and
annual revenues, as well as the unique matching mechanisms it employs, adoption
has, thus far, received little attention in the economics literature. There are,
however, a few important exceptions.
The paper that is closest to ours in terms of questions addressed is Bernal,
Hu, Moriguchi, and Nagypal (2009). That paper presents a historical analysis
of domestic adoption, uncovering the trends in different types of adoption. At
the individual level, the paper estimates the propensities of PAPs to adopt and
of BMOs to relinquish their children across time. These findings provide an
important springboard for our analysis, which takes PAPs’ and BMOs’ decisions
to participate in the adoption process as given and focuses on their behavior
within that process.
Landes and Posner (1978) suggest the opening of a market for children that
would allow for equilibrating monetary transfers between PAPs and BMOs. Our
analysis is useful in assessing this proposal, in that it identifies parents’ preferences
that would feed into estimating efficiency and the likelihood of entry to foster
care in a fully decentralized mechanism as such. Sacerdote (2002, 2007, 2009)
makes use of adoption data to study questions regarding the impacts of nature
as opposed to nurture.2 The adoption industry has received attention in other
disciplines, ranging from legal studies, to sociology, psychology, and history. For
detailed accounts of child adoption in the U.S., we refer the interested reader to
Melosh (2002), Pertman (2000), and references therein.
From a methodological point of view, our revealed preference assumption is in
line with a two-sided matching with search model (e.g., Adachi, 2003; Burdett
and Coles, 1997; Eeckhout, 1999; and Smith, 2006). We know of very few other
empirical estimations of two-sided matching with frictions (see Abramitzky, Dela-
vande, and Vasconcelos, 2011 and Botticini and Siow, 2010, Del Boca and Flinn,
2011, as well as some of the work on online dating discussed below). The existing
work focuses mainly on the marriage-market context. We note that the commit-
ment entailed in the successful conclusion of an adoption makes this process a
particularly good fit for this class of models.
Gender and racial preferences are both common and well documented (for
overviews see Loury, 2002, and Nelson, 2009). Related to this paper, several
recent papers have used matching environments of other types, particularly the
online dating market, to estimate racial preferences (e.g., Fisman, Iyengar, Ka-
menica, and Simonson, 2006, 2008; Lee, 2009; and Hitch, Hortacsu, and Ariely,
2Bjo¨rklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006) also focus on the long term effects on both education and
income of Swedish adoptees. Chen, Ebenstein, Edlund, and Li (2010) show that in domestic Chinese
adoption a propensity to adopt girls is compatible with post-natal discrimination against them.
6 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
2010). This work identifies a preference for same-race partners, much in the spirit
of the racial preferences we observe.3 Technically, adoption through facilitators
and online dating are similar in that both involve a two-sided search. However,
unlike most online dating markets, in which an outcome is an agreement for a
rather preliminary contact, outcomes in the adoption environment are effectively
binary and irreversible: A match means a likely successful adoption. In terms of
gender preferences, there is some work suggesting preferences for biological sons
in the U.S. (see Dahl and Moretti, 2008; and Almond and Edlund, 2008) and
abroad (for instance, the case of the missing women in Asia, as noted by Sen,
1990). Most of this work uses indirect indicators (e.g., separation rates of cou-
ples as a function of their children’s gender) to assess these preferences. In this
paper, we use the detailed matching data to estimate parents’ preferences over
children’s attributes directly, and we identify a substantial preference for girls in
the adoption context.
I. Institutional Setting and Data
A. The Adoption Process in the U.S.
In this Section, we summarize the main elements of the adoption process in the
U.S. (see Jasper, 2008 or Mabrey, 2006 for a full state-by-state survey of adoption
jurisdiction).
The supply side of domestic adoption is represented by a population of BMOs
who intend to relinquish their children for adoption. The children can be either
born or unborn. When not searching for adoptive parents on her own, the BMO
can use adoption agencies to be matched with PAPs.
The demand side of domestic adoption consists of PAPs. These PAPs can be
either (straight or same-sex) couples or singles. After undergoing a certification
based on a home study, PAPs who decide to search for a child domestically can use
adoption agencies, pursue a private adoption with the aid of specialized attorneys,
or advertise in local magazines and newsletters.
Each of these channels can be problematic from the PAPs’ point of view. Since
adoption agencies often operate in geographical areas where they can easily lo-
cate BMOs, or where they are subject to less regulation, it can be difficult for
PAPs (who usually reside in cities and high-income areas) to locate, screen, and
interact with many agencies at the same time. Moreover, in many states, adop-
tion attorneys are not allowed to act as intermediaries in adoptions. Independent
search through advertising is time-consuming and may entail significant cost un-
certainty. These considerations created a role for intermediaries, usually referred
to as “adoption facilitators.” Much like adoption agencies, the role of facilitators
3See also Banerjee, Duflo, Ghatak and Lafortune (2010) for an empirical analysis of the arranged
marriage market in India. They document strong preferences for within-caste marriages, similar to the
preferences for same-race partners unearthed by the online dating literature.
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is regulated by state laws, and in some states their activity is restricted.4 Often
operating online, adoption facilitators connect with BMOs from multiple agencies
and coordinate the matching process with PAPs.
Once a PAP is matched with a child, the ensuing process depends on whether
the child is born or not. If the BMO of an already born child has not yet relin-
quished her parental rights to an agency, then she can relinquish them as soon as
the match occurs. The child is then put in the custody of the PAP. If, instead,
the child is unborn, the parties wait until birth, with no commitment to complete
the adoption on either side. During this time, the PAP normally pays the living
and the medical expenses of the BMO. At birth, with a lag determined by state
law, the BMO can, if she still desires, relinquish her parental rights. In this case,
the child is placed in the custody of the PAP.
This initiates the post-placement process. The adoption is finalized when a
court transfers the parental rights to the PAP. The finalization is conditional
on a series of legal requirements determined by the state. The court bases its
decision on a report completed by a social worker on the basis of some visits to
the adopting family. The court also screens the nature of the financial transfers
that have taken place between the PAP and the BMO, as well as the transfers
that the PAP has made to the adoption agency. In particular, the court checks
that transfers to the BMO constitute allowed reimbursements of either living or
medical expenses.5
Gay, Lesbian, and Single Adoption. — Adoption by gay and lesbian couples
or individuals is permitted in only a few countries around the world. In the U.S.,
many states have enacted or attempted to enact legislation on gay and lesbian
adoption since the early 2000s. However, state laws are still largely silent on
the issue. While some states restrict adoption by sexual orientation or marital
status, legislation with respect to this issue is still in flux, and gay and lesbian
adoption is the subject of a very active and heated policy debate.6 The Census
2000 indicated that 4% of all adopted children in the U.S. live in a gay or lesbian
household. Even though in 2000 the adoption rate of same-sex households was
reported as 1.6%, this rate has the potential to increase dramatically if the current
4In fact, only in very few states, such as California and Pennsylvania, can adoption facilitators be
legally paid (see, e.g., California Family Code Sections 8623-8638, Chapter 1.5).
5Any transfer from the PAP to the BMO that is aimed to obtain consensus of the adoption is illegal.
State laws specify the precise categories of BMO expenses (such as medical, legal, and living costs) that
can be covered by PAPs, which are classified as charity. If the BMO changes her mind regarding the
adoption before finalization, all transfers are generally non-reimbursable.
6At the time of writing of this paper, only Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio Utah, and
Wisconsin imposed restrictions on gay and lesbian adoption. Nonetheless, in many states in which
statutes do not prohibit adoption by gay men and lesbians, individual judges or courts have ruled against
the practice. In fact, in 40 states, Statute or Appellate Court rulings have banned joint adoption by
same-sex couples. For details regarding states’ jurisdiction on gay and lesbian adoption, see American
Civil Liberties Foundation (2006), Human Rights Campaign (2009), and National Conference of State
Legislatures (2009).
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restrictions are lifted.7
Since the early 90s, there has been an increase in the number of adoptions
by single individuals, the vast majority of whom are women. By 2000, singles
accounted for at least 15% of all adoptive parents in the U.S. (see the Census
2000). While allowed in the U.S., adoption by local or foreign single individuals
is prohibited in the majority of countries all over the world.
B. The Data
The Facilitator’s Operations. — We constructed our data set monitoring an
online adoption facilitator who mediates between agencies dealing with BMOs
and PAPs, over the period from June 2004 to December 2009.8 Over a five year
period, we collected data on the applications of 729 PAPs to 839 BMOs. The
facilitator placed 65 children, while 409 were placed through other channels.
New cases of unborn children or already-born children available for adoption
are posted on the facilitator’s publicly accessible website regularly. Activity on
the website follows this basic timing:
1. An unborn child, or already-born child, is posted as a new case on the fa-
cilitator’s website. The child is identified by the BMO’s code name. For every
case, the facilitator publishes the following information: (a) the child’s charac-
teristics: date on which the case is presented, race composition, gender (when
available), due date for unborn children, and age for already-born children;9 (b)
the costs of adopting the child. These include a fixed facilitator fee, adoption
agency fees, BMO’s expenses (that may include living and medical costs), and
legal fees; and (c) the constraints that the BMO or the adoption agency impose
on PAPs. Specifically, the BMO can restrict the availability of her child from
same-sex PAPs, single PAPs, etc.10
2. After paying the fixed fee to the facilitator, a PAP can submit one or more
applications to adopt any of the available children at no additional cost.11 As
PAPs submit an application to a BMO, their first name (or initials) are posted
on that child’s case. The PAPs’ application consists of a letter to the BMO
sent through the facilitator and the agency. In this letter, the PAPs describe
themselves, their life-style, and how they plan to raise the child. This letter is
7See Badget, Chambers, Gates, and Macomber (2007).
8See the Data Appendix, available at: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/˜lyariv/Papers/Adoption Data Appendix.pdf,
for detailed information on the construction of the data set.
9The website also reports fetus anomalies detected by an ultrasound or other documented health
problems. However, these medical issues occur for only 0.2% of the children in our data set.
10There are some additional restrictions on the PAPs’ characteristics dictated by state laws or special
adoption regulations. For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 gives Native American Indian
Nations and Tribes the right to control adoptions that involve their tribal members’s children. In addition,
the BMO can also express her preference toward an open adoption. In our sample, in only 4% of cases
did the BMO specify a preference regarding a closed as opposed to an open adoption.
11In some cases, before applying, the PAPs receive additional information regarding the BMO and
the child based on an interview the agency conducts with the BMO. This interview comprises questions
regarding the BMO’s health and life-style, her family and the birth father characteristics.
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prepared by the PAPs at the beginning of the matching process and left with the
facilitator. In other words, the only decision a PAP has to make when a child
becomes available for adoption is whether or not to apply for that child. No other
contact between BMO and PAPs is permitted prior to a match.
3. The posted cases can be resolved in several ways: (a) the BMO chooses the
desired PAP among the applicants. As soon as a PAP is accepted by a BMO,
any active application of that PAP for other children is immediately dropped.12
The match is observable on the website, and both the BMO and the PAP leave
the process; (b) the BMO is matched through a different channel, and the child
is reported as “matched” on the website; (c) the BMO decides to parent, and the
decision is reported on the website; (d) the facilitator reports a lost contact with
the BMO; or (e) there are no applications for the case (after a wait of about one
month, the facilitator reports the case as “closed”). The latter outcome some-
times leads the BMO to parent, but in most cases the child remains unmatched.
Unmatched children enter the foster-care system, where they remain adoptable
until the age of 18. Foster care is notoriously detrimental to children’s short- and
long-term welfare.13
The entire process, from posting of a BMO on the website to finding a match
with a PAP, is very quick. Most PAP applications are submitted within the first
10 days from when a child’s information is first posted, and the average time a
BMO spends in this process is less than two months.
Summary Statistics. —
Birth Mothers’ Statistics. — Table 2 below reports the summary statistics
pertaining to children’s attributes in our data, while the summary statistics con-
ditional on a match and the time trends of some of the children’s attributes appear
in Tables A1 and A2, respectively, in the online appendix (the number of obser-
vations for each attribute corresponds to data points for which that attribute was
specified).
In terms of gender, not conditioning on the achievement of a match, 24.9% of
the children in our sample are girls, 34.3% are boys, and the rest are of unknown
gender. A child of unknown gender is either a child at an earlier stage of gestation
or a child who is less likely to have received medical attention than a child whose
gender is known.
We treat race as a continuous variable to account for children of mixed descent
(e.g, a child with a Caucasian father and an African-American mother is classi-
12In fact, the facilitator’s policy specifies that if the selected PAPs reject a match, they will not be
allowed any further applications through the facilitator. Thus, applications are binding from the PAPs’
point of view. The BMO stops receiving applications from other PAPs upon a match. However, she can
still decide to parent until she relinquishes parental rights.
13Nearly 40% of youth exiting foster care are homeless within 18 months of discharge (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1999). Entry into foster care is also associated with a much higher rate of incarceration.
See also Doyle (2008).
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Table 2—Summary Statistics for BMOs
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Girl 0.249 0.433 0 1 839
Boy 0.343 0.475 0 1 839
Caucasian 0.369 0.392 0 1 839
African-American 0.383 0.418 0 1 839
Hispanic 0.133 0.271 0 1 839
Asian 0.022 0.111 0 1 839
Non-African-American Boy 0.203 0.372 0 1 839
Non-African-American Girl 0.137 0.321 0 1 839
African-American Girl 0.112 0.291 0 1 839
African-American Boy 0.14 0.312 0 1 839
Finalization Cost 26745 8661 3500 52300 737
Already Born 0.196 0.397 0 1 839
Months to Birth for Unborn 2.691 1.889 0.033 8.6 650
Months to Birth for Born 1.574 6.241 0.033 69.733 370
Days from Presentation to Last Day on Website 54.848 45.481 1 530 829
Days from First Application to Last Application 20.465 32.647 0 217 837
Days on Website if Always Born 42.883 37.917 1 184 163
Days on Website if Always Unborn 46.14 35.055 1 217 407
Days on WebsSite if Switch from Unborn to Born 78.221 56.201 5 530 244
Number of Interested PAPs 2.316 2.295 0 16 839
Applications per Day 0.094 0.245 0 4 829
Bad Health Words 0.002 0.049 0 1 839
Single PAP Allowed 0.616 0.486 0 1 839
Same-Sex PAP Allowed 0.247 0.431 0 1 839
fied as 0.5 Caucasian and 0.5 African-American). Averaging across percentages of
each ethnicity, the unconditional breakdown in our data set is 36.9% Caucasian,
38.3% African-American, and 13.3% Hispanic. The non-African-American cate-
gory refers to children who are 0% African-American.
Already-born children constitute 19.6% of our data set, while, conditional on
being unborn, the average time to birth at which the cases are presented to the
facilitator is just below three months. The average age of already-born children
is about two months. In terms of PAPs who are acceptable to BMOs, same-sex
PAPs are allowed in 24.7% of the cases, and single women in 61.6% of the cases.14
Finally, the costs to finalize an adoption range from $3, 500 to $52, 300, in addition
to the $4, 800 fixed fee for working with the facilitator.
In terms of the outcomes of the matching process, the average number of PAPs
who apply for a given child is 2.3, varying from 0 to 16. BMOs decide to parent
their child in 5% of the cases, are reported as a lost contact in 5% of the cases,
and as a closed case in 29% of cases. The average number of days a case remains
on the facilitator’s website is 55 days, ranging from 1 to 530 days.
14There are very few cases in which lesbian PAPs are allowed to apply and gay men are not, or vice-
versa. The variable ‘Same-Sex Allowed’ identifies a baby for which at least one of these PAP categories
is considered acceptable. In addition, according to an interview with the facilitator, there are no single
men among the PAPs.
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Prospective Adoptive Parents’ Statistics. — We now turn to the demand
side, represented by the PAPs. The summary statistics on the PAPs’ attributes
are in Table 3 below, while the time trends of some of the PAPs’ attributes are
in Table A2 in the online appendix.
Table 3—Summary Statistics for PAPs
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Gay PAP 0.041 0.199 0 1 729
Lesbian PAP 0.043 0.202 0 1 729
Single PAP 0.067 0.251 0 1 729
Straight Couple 0.573 0.495 0 1 729
PAP with Ambiguous Name 0.276 0.447 0 1 729
Applies for a Baby (on a Specific Day) 0.053 0.057 0 1 729
Applies for a Baby (Allowed Choices only) 0.065 0.093 0 1 729
Applies for a Baby (at Some Point in Time) 0.060 0.067 0 1 729
Days between First and Last Application 109 200 1 1797 729
Days Since Last Application for a PAP 2.431 6.669 0 85.698 722
Applications Per Day on Website 0.098 0.209 0 2 729
Note: PAP with Ambiguous Name refers to a PAP Name such as Robin&Kim, which cannot be classified
in a PAP category. Applies for a Baby (Allowed Choices only) restricts the choices of a PAP those BMOs
for which they are allowed to apply. Applies for a Baby (at Some Point in Time) looks at the application
decision for a PAP on the last day that a BMO is on the website.
Recall that when a PAP applies for a specific child, only the PAP’s first name(s)
appear on the website next to the child requested. We therefore infer PAPs’
characteristics based on their names. When the PAP consists of one person, we
identify that PAP as a single woman. When the PAPs’ names unequivocally
indicate that the PAP is a straight couple, or a same-sex couple, we assign the
relevant attribute to the PAP. Of these PAPs, 79.1% are straight couples, 5.7%
are gay men, 5.9% are lesbians, and 9.3% are single women. We exclude from
the estimates regarding different PAPs’ categories all PAPs that have names with
ambiguous gender classification.
With respect to PAPs’ race, interviews with the facilitator confirmed that vir-
tually all of the PAPs in our data set are Caucasian. We consider a PAP active
from the time at which the PAP submits the first application until the PAP is
reported as “matched” or, if it is never reported as such, until ten days after the
last application is submitted. Given these assumptions, active PAPs apply for a
child for which they are acceptable with a 6.5% probability. The average time
elapsed between the PAPs’ first and last application is 109 days. The (average)
application probability of a PAP for an available child on each day is 5.3%, while
the probability of applying for that child at some point is 6%.15
15Consider a PAP who is active for 20 days and a BMO who is available over that entire period.
Suppose the PAP applies for the baby on day 11 (so that the PAP has an open application to the
BMO from day 11 to day 20) Then, the (average) application probability on each day is 50% while the
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II. Strategy for Estimating Adoptive Parents’ Preferences
This section presents the strategy behind our estimations regarding PAPs’ pref-
erences. We are interested in studying PAPs’ preferences over gender, race, and
finalization costs. Since many adoption-policy debates revolve around the par-
ticipation of special categories of PAPs (such as same-sex couples and singles),
we analyze how the preferences with respect to children’s attributes vary across
these categories. An observation in our sample corresponds to a triplet (t, b, p) ,
where t identifies a date, b a child who is unmatched on the website at date t, and
p a PAP that is active on the website at time t and for whom b is an available
choice – that is, b’s BMO did not exclude the type of PAP p upon entering the
matching process.16
A. Underlying Assumptions
There are two assumptions at the root of our estimations:
Revealed Preference for PAPs If two children, c1 and c2, are available on the
website on the same day, and PAP i (who qualifies for both) applies for c1
and not c2, then PAP i must prefer c1 to c2; and
Revealed Preference for BMOs If two PAPs, θ1 and θ2, apply for the same
child and the corresponding BMO j selects θ1 and not θ2, then BMO j must
prefer θ1 to θ2.
These assumptions have two important implications for our estimation strategy.
First, they allow us to assess preferences for each side of the matching process
separately. Second, they enable us to evaluate marginal rates of substitution
over attributes of parents and children when only a slice of the market is being
observed. The latter point is particularly important in view of the fact that some
PAPs may be utilizing multiple adoption channels and, likewise, some BMOs may
pursue several paths when considering relinquishing their child.
In our environment, PAPs search for a BMO to be matched with, while BMOs
search for a PAP to relinquish their child to. Therefore, one way to think of our
underlying assumptions is through a sequential two-sided matching model. In
the online appendix, we present the basic structure of such a model (which is
closely related to Burdett and Coles, 1997 and Eeckhout, 1999) and characterize
its equilibrium.
probability of applying at some point in time is 100%.
16In the online appendix, we discuss the robustness of our results to a PAPs’ activity window of 90
days (see Table A3). Also, Table A4 illustrates results obtained looking at the decision of a PAP to apply
to a BMO without including the time variation t. These alternative definitions of PAP activity do not
have a noticeable impact on our results.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE CHILD-ADOPTION MATCHING 13
B. Discussion of the Estimation Strategy
There are several features of the matching process that make the assumptions
above plausible. Since most of our analysis focuses on PAPs’ preferences, PAPs
in our data always have incentives to apply to children that are desirable to
them according to the revealed preference assumption above. In what follows, we
discuss this assumption and other important features of our matching process.
No-cost Applications. Once PAPs pay the fixed cost to the facilitator, any
application is done at no cost to the PAPs. Therefore, there is no monetary
reason to forgo an application.17
Equal Opportunity Applications. When considering BMOs’ selection of
PAPs among those who apply, we cannot reject BMOs’ selecting one of the ap-
plications at random. Indeed, a model in which the chosen PAP depends on all
observable characteristics (namely, the volume of applicants and the categories to
which they belong, in addition to the relevant child’s attributes) generates no sig-
nificant proxies of choice (see Table A5 in the online appendix). In that respect,
PAPs of different types do not exhibit different incentives to apply for particular
children.
No Supply Shock Effects in Applications. One may be concerned that
despite the lack of application costs, parents respond to competition by apply-
ing less frequently to children who are likely to receive more applications. The
restrictions BMOs impose over the admissible PAPs offer a natural variation in
potential application volume corresponding to children who are otherwise similar.
In particular, suppose we search for pairs of children with similar attributes, but
with different restrictions of admissible PAPs imposed by the BMOs. For straight
couples PAPs, the presence of restrictions against either same-sex couples or sin-
gle PAPs does not impact the PAPs’ preferences over these children, but does
shift the extent of competition they face to obtain them.
Given the large number of children in our dataset, it is possible to select sev-
eral variables (gender, race, and whether the child is born or not) for which the
matching is exact, and others, such as presentation dates and adoption finaliza-
tion costs, for which we use a nearest-neighbor propensity score to match pairs
of children (see Abadie et al., 2004). We can then compare two children that the
same straight couple PAP can apply for, with different restrictions on admissible
PAPs.
First, fewer restrictions do increase the amount of competition among PAPs for
a child. If a BMO allows same-sex PAPs (or single PAPs) to apply, we estimate
that conditional on the matched traits discussed above, there will be 50% more
applications for this child with a standard error of 9%.
Second, allowing for same-sex couple applications, raises the probability of an
application from straight couple PAPs by 0.87%, with a standard error of 0.37%.
17Furthermore, on any given day, there are on average 23 BMOs on the website, all listed sequentially
on the same page. This makes it straightforward for PAPs to browse the entire list of available BMOs.
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Similarly, allowing single PAPs to apply raises the probability of an application
from a straight couple PAP by 0.25%, with a standard error of 0.34%, and there-
fore not significant with 5% confidence. In both cases, increased competition is
not associated with fewer applications on the part of straight couple PAPs.
In addition, we replicated our estimates checking whether the number of pre-
existing applications for a child affects the probability of that child receiving an
application from a PAP. We found no significant impact of the number of previous
applications on the probability of a child getting an additional one (see Table A6
in the online appendix).
Limited Scope of Learning. Participants (both PAPs and BMOs) spend a
fairly short time interacting in the process we document. The mean number of
days a PAP spends in the process is 109, while the mean number of days a BMO
spends in the process is 54. Furthermore, PAPs make and BMOs receive only a
handful of applications while they are active. We also note that the facilitator’s
website is on public domain so that interested PAPs are likely to inspect the
website (and learn about its workings) prior to becoming active participants.
To test the scope of learning in our matching process, we examined whether
PAPs had different application behavior in the first 30 days that they were present
on the website, when there could be potential for learning, versus the period after
their first 30 days on the website. We found no statistically significant differences
in their application decisions (see Table A7 in the online appendix).
Dynamic Effects in Application Behavior. Overall, our analysis suggests
that PAPs do not go out of order in their application behavior (applying ear-
lier to some children who are lower in their preference ranking). Indeed, when
we perform our analysis ignoring the time at which applications are submitted,
considering the overall pool of children a PAP applied for, we generate virtually
identical preference estimations (see Table A4 in the online appendix).
PAPs’ Selection. One may also be concerned about the ecological validity and
interpretation of our exercise. Namely, there might be selection effects that make
the participating population of PAPs not representative of the entire population
of adoptive parents.
Using the Census 2000, we can compare aggregate characteristics of adopted
children in the U.S. and of matched children in our data set. Specifically, the
Census identifies 54% of adopted children as girls. In our data set, 25% of posted
cases correspond to girls and 34% to boys. Out of matched cases in which the
children’s gender is known, 43% correspond to girls, while 57% correspond to
boys. The comparison with the Census figures suggests that PAPS who select
into our data set are, if anything, more likely to adopt a boy relative to the
average adopting household in the U.S.
With respect to race, the Census reports 18% of adopted children as African-
American, while only 6.4% of adopted children are reported as African-American
when the head of the household is classified as Caucasian (the Census’ data is
based on a coarse classification of race). In our data, of all cases of matched
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children (through the facilitator or through other channels), 54% correspond to
children who are at least partially African-American and 24% correspond to chil-
dren who are 100% African-American. Recall that PAPs in our data set are
virtually all Caucasian. This suggests that PAPs who select into our data set are,
if anything, more open to adopting an African-American child than the average
adopting household in the U.S.
BMOs’ Selection. In order to address the concern of adverse selection of BMOs,
we obtained auxiliary data from the facilitator containing more detailed informa-
tion about 196 BMOs corresponding to recently posted cases. These data doc-
ument BMOs’ age, medical history, education, criminal record, as well as drug
and alcohol abuse. If the observed child characteristics (namely, gender and race)
are proxies for any of these, we should observe a nontrivial correlation between
observed characteristics and indicators of health and behavioral issues. Table 4
reports means of the BMOs’ health, demographic, and behavioral markers condi-
tional on the children’s gender and race.
Regarding gender, the cases corresponding to boys and girls do not appear sig-
nificantly different from one another (with 10% confidence) in any of the dimen-
sions we consider. Regarding race, we have split the data according to whether
the race composition of the child is above or below 50% African-American.18
Overall, we find that BMOs of African-American children, who are less de-
sirable according to our preference analysis in Section 4.3, consistently exhibit
slightly superior values in each of the markers. The level of pre-natal care, age,
and education achievement are all very similar across the two groups of BMOs.
However, criminal records, serious health problems, serious drug abuse, and obe-
sity are more frequent (albeit not in a statistically significant way, even with 10%
confidence) among the less African-American cases.
18Of the 196 cases in our additional data, 62 involve children whose race composition is at least partly
African-American. Of these, 6 children are 25% African-American, 29 are 50% African-American, and
24 are fully African-American. The division of the data utilized to create the table therefore corresponds
to a median split over these cases.
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Table 4—BMOs’ Selection
Panel A: Race
African-American
< 50% ≥ 50%
Mean N Mean N
Pre-Natal Care∗ 0.91 74 0.89 39
(0.03) (0.05)
Criminal Record∗∗ 0.56 43 0.56 25
(0.08) (0.10)
Serious Health Problems† 0.59 63 0.43 35
(0.06) (0.08)
Drug or Alcohol Use‡ 0.68 69 0.53 40
(0.06) (0.08)
Obesity (BMI Above 30) 0.28 101 0.3 56
(0.04) (0.06)
Age 28.2 94 28.5 50
(0.6) (0.8)
Education♠ 1.95 75 2.18 42
(0.09) (0.14)
Panel B: Gender
Boy Girl Gender Unknown
Mean N Mean N Mean N
Pre-Natal Care∗ 0.86 35 0.88 43 0.95 38
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Criminal Record∗∗ 0.57 23 0.48 23 0.6 20
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Serious Health Problems† 0.53 34 0.58 33 0.47 34
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Drug or Alcohol Use‡ 0.66 44 0.67 33 0.43 28
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Obesity (BMI Above 30) 0.25 56 0.29 49 0.26 47
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Age 29 50 28.5 45 28 44
(0.8) (0.9) (1.1)
Education♠ 2.09 44 1.88 39 2.19 27
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. ∗ Pre-Natal Care refers to a binary variable that records whether
the BMO received medical attention during the pregnancy. ∗∗ Criminal Record refers to felony convic-
tions or jail time. † Serious Health Problems include cancer, diabetes, heart condition, coma, epilepsy,
severe depression, and chlamydia during pregnancy. ‡ Drug Use includes meth, crack, heroin, cocaine,
amphetamines. Alcohol Use refers to heavy alcohol consumption during pregnancy. ♠ Education refers
to the last grade completed as follows: 1 for some high school, 2 for completed HS/GED, 3 for some
college, and 4 for a college degree.
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C. Estimation
The assumptions above are tantamount to PAPs and BMOs operating using
a (possibly time-dependent) reservation utility. In particular, a child receives an
application from a PAP if and only if the PAP’s utility from being matched with
that child exceeds the PAP’s reservation utility. For the sake of estimation, we
consider a stochastic specification and assume that each PAP of type θ assesses
the utility from a child of characteristics c as
(1) uPAP (θ; c) = βθ · c + βθ,0 + εtbp ≥ u¯PAP (θ),
where βθ,0 is a constant term that varies with PAPs’ type and year, εtbp is an
idiosyncratic unobservable distributed according to the standard normal distribu-
tion (corresponding to each triplet (t, b, p)), and u¯PAP (θ) is the reservation utility
of PAPs of type θ.
This specification allows us to estimate discrete choice models in which the
probability of applying for a match with a specific child depends on the child’s
observable attributes. Note that this method enables us to evaluate the weights
that different types of PAPs put on different attributes. However, it does not allow
us to identify the absolute level of the reservation utility, as it is confounded with
the constant term in the utility specification.
In principle, individual PAPs may be using different reservation utilities (due
to, say, access to different adoption channels). PAPs could also use a strategy
that allows for reservation utilities that vary with the time the PAPs spend on
the website. When we estimate the parameters of equation (1) controlling for the
PAPs’ time on the website, we obtain coefficients βθ that are essentially identical
to those presented below, as presented in Column III of Table A8 in the online
appendix.
Furthermore, note that any change in the supply of available children, in terms
of either volume or distribution of types, will only change the constant term in
our estimation. Therefore, PAP-day fixed effects absorb whatever changes in
reservation values occur due to supply-side shifts. We estimated the parameters
of equation (1) using a conditional logit with PAP-day fixed effects, and find
coefficients βθ that are virtually identical to those we present below (see Table
A9 in the online appendix). Thus, our identification is a consequence of the
variation in choice sets PAPs face on any given day, rather than an artifact of
differences between PAPs or changes over time. We present our results in terms of
probit coefficients since they allow us to compute marginal effects of different child
attributes on application rates, as well as identify differences in base-application
rates of different classes of PAPs.
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III. Adoptive Parents’ Preferences
Table 5 presents the results of probit estimations targeted at assessing PAPs’
preferences over different attributes and their dependence on PAPs’ categories.
We cluster standard errors by PAP-BMO pairs to account for serial correlation,
since a PAP’s application is kept on the website until the child is matched. Here
and throughout the rest of the regression tables, unless otherwise indicated, the
t-statistics appear in parentheses.
The first column of Table 5 refers to the behavior of the entire PAP population.
It corresponds to a model in which the different categories of PAPs in our sample—
straight couples, gay men, single women, and lesbian couples—are characterized
by the same utility function—namely, the coefficients βθ in (1) are restricted
to be identical across PAPs—but may have different thresholds (captured by
the dummy variables corresponding to PAPs’ categories) due to the different
streams of children for whom they can be considered. The PAPs-category dummy
variables in the first column are significantly different from one another. The
remaining columns of Table 5 correspond to estimated models in which different
categories of PAPs are allowed to have different preferences. In what follows, we
first discuss the aggregate preferences over children’s attributes and then compare
estimated preferences across different categories of PAPs.
The omitted category corresponding to all estimations reported in Table 5 is
a 2009 child, a month before birth, whose gender is still unknown, whose race
composition is zero percent African-American, and whose adoption finalization
costs are $26, 000. This omitted category of children has an 10.9% probability of
receiving an application, while a child whose attributes correspond to the popu-
lation means (as reported in Table 2) receives an application with a probability
of 8.8%.
According to the third and fourth columns of Table 5, gay and lesbian couples
have a significantly higher probability of submitting an application than straight
couples. Indeed, the probability of submitting an application for the child whose
attributes correspond to the population mean is 7.3% for straight couples, 19%
for gay PAPs, 22.1% for lesbian PAPs, and 7.7% for single women. These can
be partly explained by the constraints that gay and lesbian couples face when
adopting a child: Since many of the children on this website are not available
to them, gay and lesbian couples conceivably compensate by applying more fre-
quently when they can.
A. Adoption Finalization Costs
Our analysis reveals that PAPs’ application behavior is significantly affected
by the cost of finalizing the adoption. However, the effects we find are not very
large in aggregate terms. Indeed, Table 5 shows that an increase in adoption
finalization costs of $10, 000 decreases the probability of receiving an application
from 8.8% to 6.9%.
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Table 5—Determinants of PAPs’ Applications: Marginal Effects for Probit
Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP Lesbian PAP Single PAP
PAP Applies for BMO
Activity Window: 10 Days
Already Born (d) -0.014* -0.015 -0.020 -0.060 0.031
(-2.01) (-1.91) (-0.20) (-0.61) (0.96)
Months to Birth -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-3.46) (-2.59) (-0.24) (-0.36) (-1.07)
Finalization Cost in $10 000 -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.023 -0.109* -0.019
(-6.00) (-4.96) (-0.65) (-2.45) (-1.92)
African-American Girl -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.213* -0.232** -0.055*
(-6.18) (-5.11) (-2.38) (-2.71) (-2.31)
African-American Boy -0.065*** -0.068*** -0.050 -0.094 -0.077**
(-7.46) (-6.39) (-0.65) (-0.97) (-2.77)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.131 -0.114 -0.082***
(-8.17) (-7.22) (-1.28) (-1.40) (-3.83)
Non-African-American Girl 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.120 0.273* 0.032
(4.23) (3.73) (1.16) (2.53) (1.37)
Non-African-American Boy -0.006 -0.010 -0.020 0.128 -0.000
(-0.99) (-1.39) (-0.26) (1.76) (-0.00)
Hispanic 0.004 -0.001 0.141 -0.043 -0.028
(0.53) (-0.09) (1.35) (-0.31) (-1.09)
Single PAP (d) 0.013
(1.72)
Gay Couple PAP (d) 0.088***
(3.79)
Lesbian Couple PAP (d) 0.155***
(5.89)
Year FE X X X X X
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.088 0.073 0.190 0.221 0.077
Probability for Base Case (‡) 0.109 0.114 0.177 0.272 0.089
χ2 341.08 181.87 29.58 44.48 43.48
Log-Likelihood -219850.8 -143090.0 -5573.2 -8604.6 -20407.6
Observations 871215 592416 12982 16727 79652
PAP-BMO 30688 21386 428 544 2493
Note: (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable
from 0 to 1. ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard Errors clustered by PAP-BMO pair. (‡)
The omitted category is a gender unknown, non-African-American, unborn child, less than one month
to birth, with finalization cost of $26,000 in 2009.
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We find that alternative PAP categories respond quite differently to changes in
adoption finalization costs. Indeed, lesbian couples seem to respond to changes in
adoption finalization costs more than straight and gay couples and single women.
Thus, a $10, 000 increase in adoption finalization costs reduces the desirability of
a child by 1.8% for straight couples, 2.3% for gay men, 10.9% for lesbian couples
and 1.9% for single women. The sensitivity of these categories is consistent with
the Census 2000, which reports that adoptive straight couples and gay men are,
on average, wealthier than lesbian couples.
The fact that the probability of receiving an application is significantly influ-
enced by the finalization costs allows us to estimate an analogous model in which
coefficients associated with different attributes are expressed in dollar terms. This
estimates are reported in Table 6.
In Table A10 in the online appendix we show that, in fact, there is a strong
dependence of adoption finalization costs on children’s attributes. We find that
African-American children of unknown gender are associated with costs that are
$7, 480 lower relative to non-African-American children of unknown gender. In
addition, non-African-American boys are associated with costs that are $2, 270
lower than non-African-American girls. While these differences are significant,
notice that they are far smaller than the differences in willingness to pay for
children of different attributes that we discuss below. Thus, while differences in
costs mitigate the differences in desirability for race and gender, they provide only
partial compensation.
B. Preferences over Gender
In our data, the gender of each child is “boy,” “girl,” or “unknown.” Since
“gender unknown” maybe a consequence of limited medical attention, we mea-
sure the PAPs’ gender preference by comparing the probabilities of receiving an
application by girls and boys.
Non-African-American girls have a probability of receiving an application that
is 3.4% higher than non-African-American boys, a large effect given that the
child with mean attributes has a probability of 8.8% of receiving an application.
In other words, PAPs have a positive and sizable preference in favor of (non-
African-American) girls. According to Table 6, the increase in desirability of a
non-African-American girl with respect to a non-African-American boy is equiv-
alent to a decrease of $18, 333 in finalization costs. This higher desirability of
girls is consistent with anecdotal evidence reported by adoption agencies and the
popular press covering the adoption process.19 If we consider adoption outcomes
in the U.S., the 2000 Census reported that 46% of adopted children were male as
compared with 51% of biological children (see Kreider, 2003). Our result suggests
that these outcomes are explained, at least partially, by a significant demand ef-
fect. A preference for girls has also been documented for biological mothers by
19See, for instance, Slate (1/16/2004).
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Table 6—Determinants of PAPs’ Applications: Coefficients Expressed in Dollars
Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP Lesbian PAP Single PAP
PAP Applies for BMO
Activity Window: 10 Days
Already Born -8,194 -9,517 -9,063 -5,978 14,178
(-1.86) (-1.74) (-0.20) (-0.56) (1.08)
Months to Birth -556 -552 -313 -110 -479
(-3.45) (-2.58) (-0.24) (-0.36) (-1.06)
Finalization Cost in 10 000’s of $ -10,000 -10,000 -10,000 -10,000 -10,000
(-5.92) (-4.88) (-0.66) (-2.50) (-1.91)
African-American Girl -27,708 -28,828 -92,396 -21,350 -28,493
(-6.22) (-5.11) (-2.42) (-2.74) (-2.34)
African-American Boy -35,139 -38,069 -21,563 -8,678 -40,479
(-7.42) (-6.31) (-0.65) (-0.96) (-2.76)
African-American Unknown Gender -37,639 -42,276 -56,875 -10,441 -42,945
(-8.03) (-6.99) (-1.22) (-1.39) (-3.80)
Non-African-American Girl 15,069 15,655 52,188 25,152 16,712
(4.20) (3.72) (1.19) (2.58) (1.37)
Non-African-American Boy -3,264 -5,655 -8,646 11,763 0
(-0.99) (-1.39) (-0.26) (1.76) (-0.00)
Hispanic 2,153 -414 61,146 -3,939 -14,863
(0.53) (-0.09) (1.36) (-0.31) (-1.09)
Gay Couple PAP (d) 34,028
(4.94)
Single PAP (d) 6,806
(1.82)
Lesbian Couple PAP (d) 51,528
(8.24)
Year FE X X X X X
χ2 341.08 181.87 29.58 44.48 43.48
Log-Likelihood -219850.8 -143090.0 -5573.2 -8604.6 -20407.6
Observations 871215 592416 12982 16727 79652
PAP-BMO 30688 21386 428 544 2493
Note: Probit on Application Decision. Coefficients converted into dollar equivalents; i.e. the ratio of
the coefficient to the coefficient on finalization cost. T-statistic presented in parenthesis, clustered by
PAP-BMO pair. The omitted category is a gender unknown, non-African-American, unborn child, less
than one month to birth, with finalization cost of $26,000 in 2009.
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Gallup polls, though, interestingly, biological fathers tend to report a preference
for boys.
In our data, the preference for girls is apparent, though somewhat different,
across all categories of PAPs. Lesbian couples exhibit, by far, the most intense
preference for non-African-American girls. Indeed, for non-African-American chil-
dren, the estimated difference in application probabilities between girls and boys
is 3.8% for straight couples, 14% for gay couples, 14.5% for lesbian couples and
3.2% for single women (a chi-squared test indicates these differences are significant
at any reasonable confidence level). The strong gender preferences pertaining to
gay and straight couples suggest that women’s preference for girls is not the sole
driving force behind this preference. We note that there is a strand of literature
based on hypothetical surveys of different classes of PAPs regarding preferences
over children’s gender (see Goldberg, 2009, and references therein). Our results
are the first to report a stronger preference over children’s gender for same-sex
than for straight PAPs.
Table 5 also highlights a positive and sizable (although not statistically sig-
nificant) preference for African-American girls with respect to African-American
boys. In particular, the difference between the application probabilities for an
African-American boy and an African-American girl is 1.3%.
The gender bias we observe is compatible with the idea that girls are viewed
as “safer” in terms of dysfunctional behavior and are, therefore, more appealing
candidates for adoption. However, we suspect this does not fully explain the
gender preferences we observe since this conjecture would suggest that the gender
gap should be stronger for African-American children, for whom the gap in terms
of negative outcomes is greater between the genders.20
We note that the substantial preference for girls we document constitutes a
reversal, in the adoption environment, of the preference for sons identified by the
literature studying the preferences over gender of biological children by looking at
indirect indicators such as divorce, likelihood of the mother’s remarriage, etc. For
instance, Dahl and Moretti (2008) find that first-born daughters are associated
with a range of negative predicaments for the survival of couples.21 Since the
Census 2000 suggests that approximately 50% of households containing adopted
children do not include any biological child, it is difficult to explain this inconsis-
20There are some data backing the perception that girls are “safer” behaviorally. For instance, the U.S.
Department of Justice reports that lifetime chances of a person going to prison are significantly higher
for men (11.3%) than for women (1.8%). Also, girls are less likely to develop behavioral problems such
as autism spectrum disorders (four times more prevalent in boys than in girls, according to the Autism
Society of America), or ADHD (diagnosed two to four times as frequently in boys as in girls, see Dulcan,
1997). This conjecture has been mentioned repeatedly in the popular press, see, e.g., Slate (10/14/2003
and 1/16/2004). When considering differences between races through incarceration, the U.S. Department
of Justice reports that the imprisonment rates in 2001 were: 16.6% for African-American males, 7.7%
for Hispanic males, 2.6% for Caucasian males, 1.7% for African-American females, 0.7% for Hispanic
females, and 0.3% for Caucasian females.
21Specifically, Dahl and Moretti (2008) report that (i) women are less likely to remarry if they have
a first-born daughter than if they have a first-born son; (ii) couples tend to divorce less often if they
have first-born sons rather first-born daughters; and (iii) the number of children is significantly higher
in families with first-born girls.
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tency by the mere ordering of children in the family (which would require parents
to have dramatically different gender preferences for first and later children).
C. Preferences over Race
To our knowledge, racial preferences over offspring have not yet been docu-
mented. Anecdotal evidence from adoption agencies and facilitators suggest that
there are greater difficulties in matching African-American children with respect
to other ethnicities. However, to this date, the only evidence to support this claim
had been the gap between the proportion of African-American children awaiting
adoption in the U.S. foster-care system (32% in 2006, according to the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services Report). On the other hand, according
to the Census, 18% of adopted children are African-American, while African-
Americans represent only 15% of all children. The limitation of these statistics
is that they cannot be directly related to PAPs’ preferences. In that respect, our
data set provides a direct channel to estimate parents’ racial preferences in the
adoption environment.22
Our results show that children’s probability of receiving an application is consid-
erably affected by their race. In particular, this probability dramatically decreases
if the child is, at least partially, African-American.
Projecting the marginal effect linearly, the probability that a 100% African-
American child (of unknown gender) receives an application is 1.8% in contrast
to a probability of 13.1% for a 0% African-American child (a chi-squared test in-
dicates these differences are significant at any reasonable confidence level).23 Sim-
ilarly, application probabilities decrease dramatically for both African-American
girls and boys. In other words, PAPs in our sample exhibit a large and nega-
tive preference against African-American children. This suggests that the over-
representation of African-Americans in the population of adopted children is due
to a sizable supply effect.
From Table 6, the decrease in desirability of an African-American child of un-
known gender with respect to a non-African-American child is equivalent to a
$37, 639 increase in adoption finalization costs.
Physical similarity may be underlying these preferences. In fact, preference
for similarity, or homophily, is a well-known and documented phenomenon in the
sociology literature (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001 and references
therein).24 In the context of adoption, homophily may manifest itself in the
22Estimating preferences over physical characteristics of biological children is inherently difficult due
to the limited choice parents have over offsprings’ appearance. Furthermore, according to the Census
2000, only 4% of marriages in the U.S. are interracial, so variation in the race of biological children may
be challenging to assess.
23The 13.1% probability is derived through a linear interpolation of the 1.8% probability of application
for a 100% African-American child (of unknown gender) and the 8.8% probability of application for the
child with mean attributes (according to Table 2, 38.3% of children are African-American).
24This desire for similarity would be in line with racial preferences over romantic partners documented
by Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2006, 2008).
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desire of PAPs to adopt children who are similar to them and could, therefore,
appear as their biological offspring. Since virtually all of the PAPs in our data set
are Caucasian, homophily would be consistent with a negative attitude toward
African-American children.
Hispanic children account for 13.3% of children on the website. However, we do
not find a racial preference for or against Hispanics. The estimated desirability
of Caucasian and Hispanic children is roughly identical, with a non-significant
increase of the application probability of 0.4% if the child is Hispanic. To the
extent that Hispanic children may look different than Caucasian children, this
suggests that a preference for physical similarity alone cannot account for the
racial preferences we observe. Statistically, the 95% confidence interval for the
Hispanic coefficient is given by (−1%, 1.9%), so we cannot reject the hypothesis
that PAPs have the same preferences for Caucasian and Hispanic children.
In terms of different PAP categories, our estimates suggest that the racial pref-
erence against African-American children is somewhat stronger (although in some
cases not significantly so) for gay men, lesbian couples, and single women than
for straight couples.
IV. Adoption by Same-Sex Couples and Single Women
Reducing the number of adopted children comes at significant costs. For exam-
ple, Barth, Lee, Wildfire, and Guo (2006), as well as Hansen and Hansen (2006),
show that state and federal governments save between $65, 422 and $126, 825 on
the average child who enters foster care at age three if he or she is adopted rather
than remains there throughout childhood. Furthermore, Hansen (2006) calcu-
lated that the human service costs of adoption are about one-half the costs of
long-term foster care.25 Moreover, reducing the volume of PAPs in the matching
process may affect the distribution of attributes (gender, race, etc.) of adopted
children, as well as adopting PAPs. In this section, we quantify the effect of
bans on certain categories of PAPs (same-sex couples and single women) from
our matching process. In particular, we estimate the impact of the participation
of same-sex couples in the adoption process under consideration by assessing the
number of matches that would be lost should gay and lesbian PAPs be restricted
from participating. In our data, same-sex couples are chosen by the BMOs in 17%
of all cases of matched children for whom we know the identity of the chosen PAP.
This serves as an upper bound on the percentage of matches that would have been
lost had same-sex couples been prohibited from participating in the adoption pro-
cess. In order to generate a more conservative estimate, we count all the matched
children that received only applications from unambiguously same-sex PAPs. In
that case, banning same-sex applicants would reduce the number of applications
25She also found that when examining other social costs, such as reduced incarceration or increased
education attainment, each dollar spent on the adoption of children from foster care results in $2.45 to
$3.26 in tangible benefits to society.
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received by these BMOs to zero, effectively making a match impossible.26 This
amounts to 9% of matched cases in our data. This is clearly a large effect given
that, according to Table A1, only 19.6% of matched cases allow gay and lesbian
PAPs to apply.27 It is important to note that this method ignores two important
elements of our environment. First, it ignores the fact that certain heterosexual
parents may not appear acceptable to some birth mothers. Second, it ignores the
endogenous effects on PAPs’ application behavior. Indeed, reducing the pool of
potential parents would reduce the competition on the PAPs’ side and could lead
to less applications being submitted.
In terms of the attributes associated with children whose match would have been
lost under our exercise, we find that 80% of severed matches correspond to boys
(to be contrasted with boys representing 36% of the overall observed matches). In
terms of race, 48% of lost matches correspond to African-American children (as
compared with 39% of matched children being African-American). This suggests
that, while same-sex couples have strong preferences against boys and African-
American children, they still play an important role in their placement due to
their higher application rates, as we discussed in Section 4.
As for single PAPs, an analogous exercise generates similar results. In our
data, 14% of matched children are ultimately matched with a single PAP. 9%
of matched children received applications only from single PAPs, which serves
as an estimate of the percentage of matches that would be lost had single PAPs
been banned from the process. This is a substantial effect given that only 57% of
matched cases allow single PAPs to apply.
Of the matches that would have been lost, 68% are African-American children,
significantly higher than the percentage of African-Americans in the entire pop-
ulation of matched children. Finally, 36% of the severed matches due to the
exclusion of single PAPs correspond to boys, which is similar to the fraction of
matched boys in the sample.
V. Conclusion
We collected a novel data set to track the matching of potential adoptive parents
to birth mothers looking to relinquish their child for adoption. The detailed data
on over 800 children allow us to estimate parents’ preferences over child attributes,
most notably over gender, race, and adoption finalization costs.
We find clear patterns in parents’ preferences. First, adoption finalization costs
impact demand significantly. An increase in adoption finalization costs of $10, 000
26The significant variance observed in the number of applications BMOs receive by the time of a match
suggests that they are not determining their stay on the website based on the number of applications
received. However, our counterfactual estimates do not take into account that, had certain PAP categories
been excluded, BMOs could stay on the website longer, possibly receiving additional applications that
we do not observe.
27Among the set of matched BMOs for whom the adopting PAP can be unambiguously classified, 26%
allowed for same-sex adoption. 30% (of those 26% of matched BMOs) ultimately matched with same-sex
PAPs.
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decreases the aggregate probability of receiving an application from 8.8% to 6.9%.
Second, girls are consistently preferred to boys, and Caucasians and Hispanics
are consistently preferred to African-Americans. In monetary terms, the increase
in desirability of a girl relative to a boy can be compensated by a decrease of
approximately $18, 300 in adoption finalization costs. Similarly, the increase in
desirability of a non-African-American child with respect to an African-American
child (both of unknown gender) is equivalent to a decrease of at least $37, 600 in
adoption finalization cost.
Different categories of adoptive parents—straight, gay, lesbian, or single—have
different behaviors in the matching process. We find that gay men and lesbian cou-
ples submit applications to 19% and 22% of children, respectively, while straight
couples submit applications to only 7.3% of children. However, we do not find
evidence that same-sex couples or single women’s preferences are less sensitive
to children’s attributes than straight couples’. If anything, they seem to have
stronger preferences in favor of girls and against African-American children. Fi-
nally, our data suggest that banning same-sex parents from our sample lowers the
number of adopted children by about 9%. A similar exercise entailing the exclu-
sion of single women from our sample lowers the number of adopted children by
also approximately 9%.
While adoption is far-reaching in the U.S. (2.5% of all children are adopted in
an industry that generates 2− 3 billion dollars annually), it is still an unexplored
territory for economists. In our context, the domestic adoption process is unique
in that it allows us to answer fundamental questions regarding preferences over
race and gender.
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